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ABSTRACT 
 
We develop a theoretical framework and provide empirical estimates of the extent of several forms of 
restructuring in 130 privatized firms in a model transition economy (Slovenia) during the 1996-1998 
period. In view of the institutional developments in the transition economies, we divide restructuring into 
defensive (related to short-term cutting costs) and strategic (focused on increasing revenues through 
investment). Using predictions from the theoretical framework, we estimate a firm-level labor demand 
equation to test defensive restructuring and an augmented investment equation to assess strategic 
restructuring. The labor demand estimates point to relatively slow defensive restructuring, while the 
investment model estimates indicate the presence of credit rationing and bargaining in most types of soft 
investment. We do not find support for the hypothesis that firms treat expenditures on employee training as 
investment, but there is evidence that they behave similarly as those from developed countries in that they 
display features of profit maximizing behavior. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
What has been the extent, speed and nature of corporate restructuring during the 
transition to a market economy? While restructuring of firms is one of the most important 
aspects of the transition process, no study has addressed these issues in a systematic 
conceptual framework, using recent (post-privatization) data and a number of 
restructuring indicators.
2 Yet, the performance of most transition economies has fallen 
short of expectations, studies based on early transition data provide only tentative 
answers and there is a major debate about restructuring and performance of transition 
firms.
3  
In this study, we provide an answer to the above question by using analyzing a panel 
of annual 1996-98 firm-level data from Slovenia – one of the most successful and 
economically most advanced transition economies. We start in this section with a brief 
overview of the Slovenian institutional and policy setting. In Section 2, we present the 
theoretical framework of defensive and strategic restructuring and the corresponding 
estimating equations, while in Section 3 we describe the data and variables that we use. In 
                                                           
2 Earlier studies are reviewed for instance in Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell 
(2002). 
3 Because of an economic decline in the first several years of the transition, the countries of the former 
Soviet bloc and former Yugoslavia have performed poorly relative to both expectations and advanced 
economies (Svejnar, 2002). Surveys of privatization in the transition economies vary from finding no 
systematic effect (Bevan, Estrin and Schaffer, 1999) to noting that a weak positive effect probably 
dominates (Megginson and Netter, 2001), to concluding that the overall effect is positive (Djankov, Murrel, 
2000; Carlin et al., 2000, and Shirley and Walsh, 2000). Given that better performing firms tend to be 
privatized first (Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 2001), it is likely that and the positive effect of privatization is 
often overestimated. Stiglitz (1999) argues that the main reason for relatively poor performance is that 
successful privatisation requires effective institutional infrastructure. Svejnar (2002) points out that 
virtually all the transition economies in Central and East Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) rapidly carried out Type I reforms (macroeconomic stabilization, price 
liberalization, break-ups of SOEs and monobank system, small scale privatization, and reduction of direct 
state subsidies). However, the CIS countries, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Romania, were less successful 
in carrying out Type II reforms (large-scale privatization, establishment of a market-oriented legal system 
and accompanying institutions, and further development of commercial banking and financial system) and 
also performed worse than the CEE countries that carried out both types of reforms. Finally, Estrin (2002) 
notes that reform policies have been applied more consistently and effectively in the Visegrad countries, the 
Baltic States and Slovenia than elsewhere, especially in the rest of the former Soviet Union. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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the fourth section, we present the results of our empirical tests and in Section 5 we draw 
our conclusions. 
Our study is of interest for five principal reasons. First, the conceptual framework of 
defensive and strategic restructuring that we operationalize below is relevant for 
analyzing all types firms that are forced to react to external shocks, and in this sense our 
analytical framework has broad applicability. Second, our empirical estimation covers 
several restructuring activities, thus giving our results broader validity than is usual in 
studies of emerging market economies. Third, the sample that we use contains firms that 
differ markedly in the extent to which they carried out restructuring. Our data hence 
contain sizeable variation in the values of the key variables and thus lend themselves to 
detecting systematic effects. Fourth, in addition to being able to examine systematically 
the effect on restructuring of different types of privatization and subsequent ownership, 
we analyze the effect of employee representation on the Supervisory Boards of firms. The 
latter is an institutional feature of a number of key countries in the European Union (EU) 
and it has been adopted by several of the ten incoming EU members. The impact of this 
feature of corporate governance is not yet fully understood and we provide a test of its 
effects on a number of key restructuring variables.
4 Finally, we are able to assess whether 
a firm’s exposure to foreign versus domestic market affects the extent of post-
privatization restructuring. If the barriers between domestic and export markets are low, 
the relationship between export orientation and restructuring should be weak or 
nonexistent because both types of firms are exposed to world competition. With the fall 
of the communist regime, the Central European transition countries moved virtually 
overnight into the ranks of the most open economies in the world, thus defying the widely 
accepted infant industry thesis that firms in emerging market economies require a long William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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period of protection before being able to face world-wide competition.
5 The transition 
economy context hence provides an interesting setting in which to test the hypothesis that 
firms oriented toward the domestic market behave differently than those oriented to the 
export market. 
1.1 The Institutional and Policy Setting 
During the 1990s, Slovenia has pursued a gradual transition approach, with the 
most important reforms being macro stabilization, liberalization of trade and increase of 
product market competition. Price stabilization was achieved through restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies that brought down inflation from 21.5 percent per month in 
October 1991, when Slovenia launched its own currency, to an annual rate of 6-7 percent 
in the late 1990s. Slovenia also pursued a policy of managed flexible exchange rate and 
low import duties. This, together with an aggressive development of small and medium 
sized firms and government hardening of the budget constraints of the large socially-
owned firms, has led to greater competition on the domestic market and improved 
competitive position on the western markets  (Prašnikar et al., 2001). Foreign capital has 
not played a significant part.  
Compared to the aggressive pursuit of consistent macro policies, the government 
has placed relatively less emphasis on the development of efficient labor and capital 
markets. The financial system as a whole has remained underdeveloped and it represents 
a minute part of corporate financing, despite the extensive restructuring of banks and the 
founding of a stock exchange (Ribnikar, 1999, and Gregorič et al, 2000). Privatization of 
firms to insiders or outsiders took place in the early to mid 1990s, relying on a 
combination of voucher and manager-worker buy-out methods, and resulting in primarily 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 For earlier studies see Cable and FitzRoy (1980), Clegg (1983), Crouch (1983) and Svejnar (1982). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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insider (internal) or outsider (external) ownership.
6 The varying degrees of ownership of 
firms by investment privatization funds, state funds, other non-financial enterprises, 
employees, former employees, retirees, and other small shareholders makes Slovenia be 
an interesting laboratory for examining the effects of different forms of privatization and 
resulting patterns of ownership on restructuring and performance of firms. 
  A potentially important aspect of corporate governance is the German-style 1993 
Law on Workers’ Co-Determination that gives employees in companies with 500 to 
1,000 (more than 1000) employees at least one-third (one-half) of seats on the 
Supervisory Boards of their firms. Since the Supervisory Board elects company 
management and also has other channels of influence, the employee-insiders potentially 
play an important role in the firms’ decision making process (Prašnikar and Gregorič, 
2002). Employee influence is also reflected in collective bargaining, which has permitted 
wages to vary across firms and defied government attempts to reign in real wage growth.  
 
2.  THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ESTIMATING MODELS  
Building on Grosfeld and Roland (1997), Aghion, Blanchard and Carlin (1997) and 
Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999), we conceptually divide restructuring of 
firms into defensive or reactive (primarily related to short-term measures, such as cost 
cutting) and strategic (focused on increasing revenues and profits in the medium- to long-
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Most Latin American countries, India and many other Asian economies, and most African countries 
followed the infant industry prescription in maintaining for decades sizable tariff and non-tariff protection. 
6 The 1992 Privatization Law allocated 20 percent of a firm’s shares to insiders (workers), 20 percent to the 
Development Fund that auctioned the shares to investment funds, 10 percent to the National Pension Fund, 
and 10 percent to the Restitution Fund. In addition, in each enterprise the workers' council or board of 
directors (if one existed) was empowered to allocate the remaining 40 percent of company shares for sales 
to insiders (workers) or outsiders (through a public tender). Based on the decision on the allocation of this 
remaining 40 percent of shares, firms can be classified as being privatized to insiders (the internal method) 
or outsiders (the external method). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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term).
7 While defensive restructuring reflects immediate, shock-induced managerial 
decisions (e.g., layoffs and basic financial rehabilitation), the concept of strategic 
restructuring aims at capturing more deliberate investments in the development of firms’ 
advantages, including changes in the composition of the labor force and investment in 
fixed capital as well as “soft” capital, such as research and development (R&D), 
marketing and training.  
2.1 Labor Force Restructuring  
In order to capture the defensive and strategic employment adjustments of firms when 
they are confronted with demand shocks, we start with a model in which the firm faces 
quadratic costs d and e in adjusting its labor L and capital K inputs, respectively, and 
minimizes the cost of production Ct: 
t ]        ) K e(   +   ) L d(   +   L   W   +   K   c [ ) r (   E   =   C
2
+ t + t + t + t + t + t
0 = c
t t ∀ ∆ ∆ + Σ
∞
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ 2
) 1 (
1  
subject to a production constraint 
t,        , Q   =   ) K   , L Q( + t + t + t ∀ τ τ τ  
where E is the expectation operator, subscript t denotes time, r is the discount rate, c is 
the user cost of capital, W is the wage, ∆Lt = Lt – Lt-1 and ∆Kt = Kt – Kt-1 are the one-
period (year) adjustments in the labor and capital inputs, respectively, and Q is the firm’s 
output or revenue. The adjustment costs d may reflect explicit financial costs, such as 
severance payments, or implicit costs such as the perceived difficulty of re-hiring 
specialized workers that had been laid off. 
Assuming further that the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form, 
changes in employment from period to period are not very large, the exogenous variables 
                                                           
7 Grosfeld and Roland (1997) and Aghion et al. (1997) introduce the theoretical concepts, while Frydman et 
al. (1999) estimate the effects of ownership on changes in revenues and costs using balance sheet data. We William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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follow an autoregressive process of the second degree, and the institutional features 
discussed above may be important, one obtains a log-linear estimating equation of the 
form 
lnLit=  α0  +  α1lnQit  +  α2lnQit-1  +  α3lnWit + α4lnWit-1  +  α5lnLit-1  +  α6  EXTPRIVit + 
α7OWNERFUNDSit  + α8OWNERFIRMSit + α9OWNEROTHERit + α10EXTBOARDit +  
+ α11HOMEMKTit + α12’(YEARt) + α13’(INDi) + εit .     
 (1) 
In equation (1), subscript i denotes firms, Q is the real revenue of the firm and EXTPRIV 
is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm was privatized primarily to external owners and 0 
if it was privatized primarily to insiders (managers and workers). Variables 
OWNERFUNDS, OWNERFIRMS and OWNEROTHER measure the percentage of a given 
firm’s shares that are owned by the state and investment funds, other firms and other 
(miscellaneous) owners, respectively.  The miscellaneous owner category does not 
include the percentage of shares owned by insiders (workers, managers and retired 
workers) because this share of ownership is treated as the base, captured in the regression 
constant, against which the effects of other forms of ownership are being estimated. 
EXTBOARD measures the percentage of non-employee representatives on the 
Supervisory Board and HOMEMKT is the share of total sales going to the home 
(domestic) market. Finally, YEAR and IND are annual and industry dummy variables 
that control for macroeconomic shocks and industry-specific conditions, respectively, 
while εit is the error term. 
  Equation (1) permits us to estimate separately the short-term effects that 
correspond to defensive restructuring, as well as the long-term effects that capture more 
                                                                                                                                                                             
present theoretical models that develop and apply the concepts defensive and strategic restructuring, and we 
test the predictions using a wide variety of performance indicators. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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the strategic managerial behavior. For example, the short-term elasticity of employment 
with respect to revenue is given by α1, while the corresponding long-term elasticity is 
given by the ratio (α1 + α2)/(1 - α5).
8 The short and long-term employment elasticities 
with respect to wages and the other variables are defined analogously.  
In terms of our conceptual framework, equation (1) contains the following 
hypotheses about the extent and speed of firm restructuring during the transition: 
H1: Firms adjust employment in response to changes in the relevant 
exogenous variables (α1 ≠ 0 and/or α2 ≠ 0 and/or α3 ≠ 0 and/or α4 ≠ 0). 
H2a: Firms adjust employment rapidly, with the adjustment being 
completed within one year of a given change in the relevant exogenous 
variable (complete adjustment model: α2 = α4 = α5 = 0). 
H2b: Firms adjust employment gradually over time (dynamic model: α2 ≠ 
0 and/or α4 ≠ 0 and/or α5 ≠ 0). 
Hypothesis 1 enables us to assess if the adjustment in employment is significant or 
whether firms resist adjusting employment and thus resemble the traditional (stodgy), 
socially-owned enterprises (Basu, Estrin and Svejnar, 1997). Hypothesis 2a states that 
employment adjustment is completely in the form of short-term, defensive restructuring, 
while hypothesis 2b reflects employment adjustment that is in the form of long-term, 
strategic restructuring. 
Equation (1) also permits us to test specific hypotheses about the employment 
effects of the institutional characteristics of firms’ privatization and corporate 
governance. In particular, there has been a major debate about whether employee 
                                                           
8 The short-term elasticity measures the contemporaneous percentage effect on employment of a one-
percent increase in firm’s real revenue in a given year, while the long-term elasticity measures the 
estimated percentage effect on employment over time of a one percent increase in the revenue in a given 
year. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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ownership and control are associated with excessive use of labor or labor hoarding (e.g., 
Hinds, 1990 and Brada, 1994), no employment effect (e.g., Prasnikar, Svejnar, Mihaljek, 
and Prasnikar, 1994), or whether employee insiders actually restrict employment so as to 
increase their own wages (e.g., Bonin, Jones and Putterman, 1993.). We have rich data in 
this area and can test these propositions with three sets of variables: whether the firm was 
privatized primarily to external vs. internal owners (EXTPRIV), extent of external vs. 
internal ownership in any given year (OWNERFUNDS,  OWNERFIRMS and 
OWNEROTHER) and the percentage of non-employee representatives on the firm’s 
Supervisory Board (EXTBOARD). The corresponding ceteris paribus hypotheses are:  
H3: Firms privatized primarily to external owners operate with 
a) fewer employees (α6 < 0 ), 
b) same number of employees (α6  = 0), or 
c) more employees (α6 > 0). 
H4: Firms owned more by outsiders (investment funds, other firms and/or 
miscellaneous other owners) than employee insiders operate with 
a) fewer employees (α7 < 0 and/or α8 < 0 and/or α9 < 0 ), 
b) same number of employees (α7 = α8 = α9 = 0), or 
c) more employees (α6 > 0 and/or α7 > 0 and/or α8 > 0 and/or α9 > 0). 
H5: Firms with a greater percentage of external (non-employee) members 
of the supervisory boards operate with 
a) fewer employees (α10  < 0 ), 
b) same number of employees (α10  = 0), or 
c) more employees (α10  > 0). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
  9
  Finally, the extent to which firms economize on inputs, including labor, 
may or may not be systematically related to whether they produce more for the 
domestic or export markets. Alternatively, if the barriers between domestic and 
export markets are not sufficiently low, then exporting firms face more 
competitive conditions and may be expected to use less labor, given output, wages 
and other conditions. The relevant ceteris paribus hypotheses to be tested hence 
are: 
H6: Firms that sell a larger proportion of their output on the domestic 
(home) market use 
a) the same amount of labor as firms that sell more output on the foreign 
market (α11 = 0) or 
b) more labor than firms that sell more output on the foreign market (α11 > 
0). 
 
2.2.  Restructuring through Investment 
While defensive restructuring enables firms to adjust in the short run and survive, 
strategic restructuring through investment in fixed and soft capital permits firms to 
achieve greater competitiveness on the domestic and foreign markets. The importance of 
investment in fixed capital has been amply documented in the business and economics 
literatures. The literature on investment in soft capital, such as R&D, marketing and 
training/education is more recent but equally important. R&D expenses may for instance 
be included in the framework of the production function if output is a homothetic 
function of physical capital and technology acquired through R&D (Mairesse, Sassenou, 
1991) and one may replace output by sales revenue in the production function since part William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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of R&D expenses represents the development of new products (Griliches, 1986).
9 
Chandler (1993) puts emphasis on investment in new markets, with firms shifting sales 
from declining to expanding markets and carrying out greater investments in market 
research, development of new market routes, promotion (designing trademarks), and 
sales. Batra (1997) in turn stresses the investment aspect of marketing expenditures in 
firms that operate in transition countries, pointing to the importance of competitiveness in 
both the domestic and foreign markets.
10 Finally, Milkovich and Bloom (1998) consider 
investments made by firms in employee training an important source of competitive 
advantage for the firms in the world of global competition. This is especially important 
for firms operating in transition countries because they often need to carry out radical 
reorganization of their human resources (Carlin et al., 1994).  
In order to capture these aspects of strategic restructuring empirically, we estimate 
an investment equation that incorporates firm’s output demand (demand side), internal 
funds (supply side) and the bargaining about -- tradeoff between -- investment and wages 
(Fazzari et al. 1988 and Prasnikar and Svejnar, 2000). As in the preceding subsection, we 
first outline the theoretical framework that underlies our estimating equations. 
One possible starting point is a neoclassical model, in which the firm is assumed 
to maximize profit 
  πt= Qt - WtLt - ctKt 
                                                           
9 Many Slovenian firms introduced transactional management in the period of early transition that led to 
lower R&D expenses and the closing down of R&D departments. After firms were privatized, R&D 
expenditures increased, especially to exchange “old-fashioned” products with new ones and to improve 
technology. 
10 Slovenian firms were forced to reorient their business activities in the transition period from the 
‘undemanded’ ex-Yugoslav market to the ‘demanded’ European market where they compete for a market 
share with competitors from all over the world. On the other hand, with the liberalization of the foreign 
trade, the competition on the domestic markets increased, too.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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where Q is revenue, W is the wage (labor cost per employee) and c is the user cost of 
capital. With a Cobb-Douglas production function, the model yields a gross investment 
equation of the form  
 It = Σgk α(1/c)t-k Qt-k + δKt-1 + et        k=0,1,2,...m,          (2) 
where I is the gross investment of the firm and α and δ are parameters (Lizal and Svejnar, 
2002). Equation (2) may also be derived from an accelerator model of investment and it 
is usually operationalized by relating the firm's investment/capital ratio to a polynomial 
of its revenue/capital ratio:
11   
  ,   +     t K
Qi,t-k   +     =  
K
I
1 - t i
k
m
1 k 1 - t i
it ε γ α )
, , ( ∑
=
           
  (3)  
where m is the number of lagged terms used in estimation.  
Equation (3) implicitly assumes that the firm operates in a perfect capital market 
in that it may obtain as much external capital as it wants at the same rate as that at which 
it can lend its internal funds. However, the underdeveloped nature of the capital markets 
in the transition economies and the existence of informational asymmetries between 
banks and firms suggest that firms may face constraints on external financing (Bole, 
1999, Meyendorff and Thakor, 2002). If this is the case, the amount of any given firm’s 
investment will vary positively with the amount of funds that it can generate internally.
12 
It is customary to test for this phenomenon by augmenting equation (3) with a proxy for 
these internal funds, such as profits (e.g., Lizal and Svejnar, 2002). 
                                                           
11 Note that the usual assumption on the form of heteroskedasticty of εt leads to scaling with the reciprocal 
of capital. We hence use εt to denote the transformed error terms. 
12 An alternative interpretation of the case when the firm’s level of investment varies positively with 
internal funds – one that is consistent with perfectly functioning capital markets -- is that the firms can 
borrow investment funds at a constant market rate but that this rate exceeds the rate at which the firms can 
lend because of transaction costs (e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Almeida and 
Campello (2002)). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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  In a transition economy setting, it is also important to assess the extent to which 
employee ownership and/or control affect the firm’s investment. The literature on 
participatory and labor-managed firms has for a long time debated the existence and 
seriousness of the so called “under-investment problem,” allegedly brought about by the 
short time horizon of individual workers in these firms. The basic argument is that worker-
insiders, unlike diversified capital owners (outsiders), prefer to distribute enterprise surplus 
as current labor income and fringe benefits rather than reinvesting it in the firm for future 
growth (e.g., Furubotn and Pejovich, 1970, and Vanek, 1970). More recently, Blanchard and 
Aghion (1995) have followed this thesis by arguing in the transition context that insider-
dominated firms may not generate resources needed for restructuring activities such as 
investment.
13 We hence use explanatory variables that permit us to assess the extent to 
which (a) there is bargaining over the internally generated funds that the firm could use 
for investment versus expenditures on wages, salaries and bonus payments and (b) 
employee ownership and/or control affect negatively the firm’s investment. 
  To tackle the issue of bargaining, let profit π be defined as revenues Q minus 
labor costs WL and all non-labor costs H: π = Q – WL – H. Moreover, let WL - W
aL be 
the difference between the actual and reservation level of wage bill (labor cost), where W
a 
is the reservation (best alternative) wage.
14 The extent to which employee-insiders earn 
more than their reservation income (WL - W
aL > 0) reflects their ability to appropriate 
what would otherwise be the firm’s surplus. WL - W
aL is hence an outcome of bargaining 
over the firm’s internally generated funds. Since we analyze strategic decisions over labor 
                                                           
13 In the context of the transition to a market economy, the investment-wage issue is especially important. The 
lifting of central controls and insider privatization gave workers significant powers in enterprises in countries 
such as Russia, Ukraine and some other newly independent states (NIS). Moreover, with the inability of many 
firms in these economies to pay wages, the tradeoff between using the firm’s value added for financing 
investment versus paying wages and fringe benefits has become particularly acute. 
14 The reservation wage is defined as the wage below which employees would be unwilling to work in the 
firm. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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cost as well as investment in several areas, we include expenditures on research and 
development IRD, expenditures on marketing IM and expenditures on training IT in the 
internal funds that are subject to bargaining.
15 The measure of internal funds that we use 
is therefore given by  
π
a = π + (WL - W
aL) + (IRD+IM+IT) = Q - W
aL – H + IRD+IM+IT  
 We  include  π
a as a proxy for the internal funds variable in an augmented form of 
equation (3) and interpret the estimated coefficient on π
a as a measure of the extent to 
which firms with more internal funds invest more than others, ceteris paribus. We also 
include WL - W
aL as an explanatory variable in the augmented equation (3) in order to 
assess if worker earnings over and above the reservation level result in a lower level of 
investment, controlling for π
a and the other regressors. The estimated coefficient on WL - 
W
aL hence gives us the magnitude of the bargaining tradeoff between extra labor cost and 
investment.  
To answer the second question, namely whether employee ownership and control 
have a negative effect on firm’s investment, we include as explanatory variables a 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm was privatized primarily to external owners 
(EXTPRIV), variables measuring the percentage of a given firm’s shares that are owned 
by the investment funds (OWNERFUNDS), other firms (OWNERFIRMS) and other 
external owners (OWNEROTHER), respectively, and a variable measuring the 
percentage of non-employee representatives on the Supervisory Board (EXTBOARD).  
The resulting estimating equation is given by 
                                                           
15 I.e., we capture the fact that employees may try to appropriate as income some funds that could otherwise 
be used for expenditures on R&D, marketing and training. We also implicitly assume that the reservation 
level of these expenditures is zero, which is not unrealistic in the context of the transition economies. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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Iit/Kit-1 = β0  +  β1(Qit/Kit-1) + β2(π
a
it/Kit-1) + β3(WL - W
aL)it/Kit-1  +  β4EXTPRIVit  + 
β5OWNERFUNDSit  +  β6OWNERFIRMSit  +  β7OWNEROTHERit + β8EXTBOARDit + 
β9HOMEMKTit+ β10’YEARt + β11’INDi + εit,                  (4) 
As in the case of equation (1), equation (4) contains firm-specific variables related to the 
firm’s orientation towards the domestic versus foreign market and controls for industry 
characteristics and annual macroeconomic shocks. The inclusion of the variable capturing 
the share of firm’s sales on the domestic market reflects the hypothesis that exporting 
firms that face greater competition and hence need to invest more than their domestically 
oriented counterparts in order to succeed. 
Equation (4) contains the following key hypotheses about strategic restructuring 
of firms in the transition economies, as reflected in their investment behavior: 
H7: A firm’s investment is positively related to its revenue (β 1 > 0). 
H8: Firms face financial constraints and their investment depends 
positively on the level of internal funds (β2 > 0). 
H9: Employees are able to appropriate internal funds that would otherwise 
be used for investment (β3 < 0). 
H10: Firms privatized primarily to external as opposed to internal owners 
invest  
a) more (β 4 > 0) or 
b) the same (β 4 = 0). 
H11: Firms owned more by outsiders (investment funds, other firms and/or 
other owners) than employee insiders invest  
a) more (β 5 > 0 and/or β 6 > 0 and/or β 7 > 0) or 
b) the same (β 5 = β 6 = β 7 = 0). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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H12: Firms with a greater percentage of external (non-employee) members 
of the supervisory boards invest  
a) more (β8 > 0) or 
b) the same (β8 = 0). 
H13: Firms oriented more towards the domestic market invest  
a) less than export-oriented firms (β9 < 0) or 
b) the same as export-oriented firms (β9 = 0). 
 
2.3. Statistical Issues 
In interpreting the coefficients of equations (1) and (4), it is important to 
remember that the constant term serves as the base that reflects certain characteristics 
against which we measure the other effects. In particular, the constant reflects the effect 
of firms that have been privatized primarily to insiders (EXTPRIV = 0), are completely 
insider-owned (OWNERFUNDS = OWNERFIRMS = OWNEROTHER = 0), do not have 
non-employee representatives on the supervisory board (EXTBOARD = 0), and export all 
of their output (HOMEMKT = 0). 
 It should also be noted that by using micro-level panel data we are able to 
eliminate bias introduced by using aggregate investment data (Abel and Blanchard, 
1986), reduce measurement error and take into account heterogeneity across firms and 
over time (e.g., Bond and Meghir, 1994). Given that we have panel data, we employ the 
Hausman (1978) specification test to establish if the fixed or random effects specification 
is preferable.  
Another statistical issue that needs to be considered is the possibility of 
endogeneity, either because some regressors are jointly determined with the dependent 
variable or because they are influenced by unobserved characteristics of firms. In order to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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assess the sensitivity of our results to this problem, we have carried out estimations using 
several methods. First, depending on the results of the Hausmann test, we present 
estimates based on fixed or random effects specifications that eliminate the firm-specific 
component in the error term as a possible cause of the endogeneity problem. The 
shortcoming of this approach is that it does not eliminate other sources of endogeneity 
and it may magnify the effect of errors in measurement of variables. We hence also report 
instrumental variable (IV) estimates, in which we instrument the potentially endogenous 
regressors.
16 The advantage of this approach is that with an appropriate choice of 
instrumental variables, one eliminates all components of endogeneity, including the firm-
specific component in the error term.
17 We use lagged levels of regressors as instruments 
and find that the explanatory power of the first-stage regression is satisfactory, with R
2 
ranging from 0.5 to 0.7. We are fortunate that our firm-level data come from two sources 
-- questionnaires that we administered to firms and the Slovenian Statistical Office. The 
questionnaire data relate to 1996-98, but the Statistical Office data cover earlier years as 
well. We use the Statistical Office data for the lagged values of variables that we use as 
instruments and thus avoid the substantial loss of degrees of freedom that we would incur 
if we had to use 1996 data as instruments for 1997 values of variables.  
                                                           
16 In the employment adjustment equation, we instrument the logarithm of sales, wage and lagged 
employment. In the investment equation, we instrument sales revenue per lagged capital, internal funds per 
lagged capital and actual less reservation labor costs per lagged capital. In principle, a maximum-likelihood 
estimation (MLE) is more efficient, but in our model it requires numerical integration and is sensitive to 
misspecification. Since MLE is a large sample estimator and our sample contains at most 130 observations 
per year, we use the more robust IV approach. 
17 We find that in the investment equations there is indeed correlation between the explanatory variables 
and firm-specific individual effects in the residuals in OLS.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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For equation (1) we also report ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates because 
Kiviet’s (1995) Monte Carlo studies find OLS superior to the IV method in estimating 
dynamic panel data equations, especially when the time dimension is low.
18  
Finally, note that depending on the estimation technique, EXTPRIV may also 
serve as a control variable for selectivity in privatization. For instance, if insiders acquire 
firms that display certain behavioral features (e.g., higher investment in R&D) and this 
effect is not adequately controlled for by the estimation technique or the other 
explanatory variables, the coefficient on EXTPRIV will reflect this feature. In general, 
fixed and random effect estimators control for the above problem, as does appropriate 
selection of instrumental variables. 
 
3.  DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND VARIABLES  
The sample contains 1996-98 annual data on 130 largest Slovenian firms that were 
privatized in the 1993-1995 period.
19 We hence observe the firms in the immediate post-
privatization period when they could carry out defensive and strategic restructuring. Most these 
firms are registered as joint stock companies and in 1998 they generated 15 percent of 
total income and employed 16 percent of all employees among the firms registered in 
Slovenia. The data set is unique in that it provides information on a number of key 
variables, namely investment in R&D, marketing and training that are usually not 
available in balance sheets and income statements.  
As may be seen from the summary statistics in Table 1, the variables display 
reasonable mean values and considerable variances. The average firm in the sample 
                                                           
18 One can also estimate a first-difference IV model, but this approach both magnifies the error in 
measurement of variables and reduces significantly the number of available observations. Since we only 
have a short panel, we do not employ this method. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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employs 573 workers, achieves a ratio of sales to tangible capital of 2.8 and sells 60.5 
percent of the value of its products on the domestic market. Gross investment in fixed 
capital and marketing expenditures are each equivalent to about 15 percent of tangible 
capital, while investment in R&D and externally provided training equal to 8 and 1 
percent of tangible capital, respectively.
20 Over 80 percent of the marketing expenditures 
are geared toward the domestic market. Slightly more than one-half of the firms were 
privatized primarily to insiders, and the average share ownership is 37 percent by each 
insiders and investment funds, 14 percent by other firms and 12 percent by other owners. 
Finally, the average share of non-employee representatives on the supervisory boards of 
firms is only 43 percent, confirming that employees have a significant representation on 
these boards. 
The average intertemporal adjustments, not reported in a tabular form, include a 
decline in net employment of 5 percent in both 1996 and 1997 and a 3 percent decline in 
1998, a reduction in the relative differential between actual and reservation wages from 
37 percent in 1996 to 17 percent in 1998,
21 a 2.6 percent annual increase in the capital 
stock, a 3.4 percent annual increase in real sales per worker, and a 2.1 percent annual 
increase in labor costs. The average ownership share of insiders (employees, managers 
and retired employees) dropped slightly from 37.4 to 36.3 percent,
22 the share of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 The actual number of firms used is somewhat lower and varies across regressions (from 106 in the 
employment equation to 93 in the training equation), depending on the availability of data for particular 
variables. 
20 Marketing expenses are usually divided into expenses for research, market communication, sales, and 
distribution (Preisner, 1996). In order to be able to compare firms across industries, we have excluded 
expenses related to salespersons employed in retailing positions. 
21 The reservation wage is calculated on the basis of the average wage within each industry in a given 
region, region-specific unemployment rate, and average annual unemployment compensation: 
W
a = AIW*(1-UR)+UC*UR, 
where AIW = average annual wage per employee in a given industry and region, UR = average annual 
unemployment rate in a given region and UC = average annual unemployment compensation. 
22 The average share of employees fell from 24.9 to 22.9 percent, while the managers’ share rose on 
average from 1.8 to 2.8 percent. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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investment funds from 37.9 to 35.7 percent,
23 and the share of others (small shareholders, 
state and banks) from 13.6 to 12.2 percent,
24 while the share of non-financial firms 
increased from 10.7 to 17.2 percent
25 in the period 1996-1998. Investment in fixed capital 
relative to sales increased from 5.6 in 1996 to 6.7 percent in 1998 and marketing 
expenditures to sales rose from 3.6 in 1996 to 4.1 percent in 1998. In contrast, investment 
in R&D relative to sales increased only by 0.24 percent points from 2.06 to 2.30 in the 
1996-1998 period and training expenses actually declined from 0.28 percent in 1996 to 
0.19 percent in 1998.
 26 
 
4.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Employment Adjustment 
In Table 2, we present the estimated coefficients of the employment adjustment 
model given by equation (1). Except for α2 in the fixed effects specification, the 
estimated coefficients on current and lagged real revenue and wages are statistically 
significant in all three equations, indicating that the firms’ employment adjustment has 
been significantly associated with changes in these variables. Hypothesis H1 (α1 ≠ 0 
and/or α2 ≠ 0 and/or α3 ≠ 0  ofand/or α4 ≠ 0) hence receives strong support -- in virtually 
all cases one cannot reject the hypothesis that each of these four coefficients is 
statistically different from zero. 
                                                           
23 Within this category, the average share of state funds declined from 23.9 to 17.8 percent, while the share 
of private investment funds increased from 14 to 17.9 percent. 
24 Within this category, the average share of small shareholders fell from 3.8 to 3 percent, whereas the 
average ownership shares of banks and state remained the same at 1.3 and 2 percent, respectively. 
25 Non-financial firms on average increased their share from 10.7 percent to 17.2 percent, whereas the 
average ownership share of banks remained the same at 1.3 percent. 
26 Expenses for training include only payments for the services of external educational institutions. Many 
firms run internal training programs, the cost of which is not included in our data. Similarly, Milkovich and 
Boudreau (1997) report that in the United States firms with more than 100 employees paid $10.3 billion on 
training to external providers, while the total training cost was $52.2 billion in 1995.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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The estimated coefficients on current and lagged values of the explanatory 
variables, and the corresponding calculated elasticities indicate that while the immediate 
(defensive) adjustment in employment is sizable, it is not complete and gradual 
adjustment of employment over time, associated with strategic restructuring, is both 
substantial and statistically significant.  Hypothesis H2b (α2 ≠ 0 and/or α4 ≠ 0 and/or α5 
≠ 0) rather than 2a (α2 = α4 = α5 = 0) is hence supported by the data. 
The impact of the number of employees in the previous period is large in the 
levels equations and it also indicates that firms adjust employment relatively slowly over 
time. Short run elasticity of employment with respect to the labour costs per employee 
has a value of about –0.6 in the OLS and fixed effects models, and about –0.3 in the IV 
equation. The point estimates of the long run elasticities of employment to labor cost are 
higher (but not statistically so) than the short run ones in the OLS and IV estimations and 
they are similar at –0.45 in the fixed effects model.
27 An analogous pattern is observed in 
the case of employment elasticity with respect to sales except that all three estimates of 
the short run elasticity are similar. Firms respond to a one percent increase in sales by 
raising employment by about 0.2 percent in the short run, while the long-run elasticity is 
about 1 in the OLS and IV cases and 0.3 in the fixed effects specification.  
The estimated coefficients α6 ,α7, α8 ,α9, and α10 provide strong evidence 
against the hypothesis that insider privatisation, employee ownership and 
employee control through board membership are associated with higher or lower 
employment intensity. In particular, both estimates of the form of privatisation are 
statistically insignificant, thus giving support to hypothesis H3b (α6 = 0). 
Similarly, eight out of nine estimated ownership coefficients are statistically 
                                                           
27 Since the Hausman test identifies fixed effect as being the preferred specification, we report the fixed 
effects estimates. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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insignificant, and the one statistically significant coefficient (the IV estimate of the 
effect of ownership by other firms) is positive but minute. Our results thus indicate 
that particular forms of internal and external ownership are not associated with 
different employment policies of firms, thus providing strong support for 
hypothesis H4b (α7 = α8  = α9 = 0). Finally, while two of the three estimates of the 
effect of greater representation of non-employee outsiders on the supervisory 
board of the firm are negative and significant (suggesting that greater employee 
representation increases employment), their quantitative effect is miniscule.   
Hence, while statistically hypothesis H5a (α10  < 0) receives some support, our 
results indicate that substantively the composition of the supervisory board is not 
associated with differences in employment policies in the transition firms. We 
have also tested an encompassing hypothesis that all five coefficients related to 
internal vs. external privatization, ownership and control are jointly statistically 
not different from zero (α6 = α7 = α8  = α9  = α10 = 0) and could not reject this 
broader hypothesis.
28 
The three estimates of coefficient α11 in Table 2 are all insignificant, 
supporting hypothesis H6a (α11 = 0) that firms selling a larger proportion of their 
output on the domestic (home) market use the same amount of labor, ceteris 
paribus, as firms that sell more output on the foreign market. This evidence 
suggests that competition brought about by the openness of the transition 
economies to world markets ensures that exporting and non-exporting firms pursue 
the same employment policies. 
 
                                                           
28 The F test results (OLS: F(5, 250)=0.52; FE: F(4,150) = 1.70; IV: F(5, 153)=0.93) do not permit us to 
reject the null hypothesis. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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4.2.   Investment 
Estimated coefficients of Equation (4), relating to strategic restructuring of firms 
through investment, are reported in Table 3. The first point to note is that investment in 
employee training is virtually unrelated to any of the explanatory variables, suggesting 
that firms in transition economies do not treat training as an investment, a point to which 
we return presently.  
The neoclassical and accelerator models of firm behavior receive support with 
respect to investment in R&D and marketing in both domestic and foreign markets, with 
the β1 coefficient on sales revenues being positive and statistically significant in both 
estimating procedures. The support is more mixed for investment in fixed capital and 
employee training, where the estimates of β1 are positive and statistically significant in 
the random effects specifications and positive but statistically insignificant in the IV 
equations. Overall, we hence find considerable though not overwhelming support for 
hypothesis H7 (β 1 > 0) that the transition firms’ restructuring through investment is 
positively related to the demand for their product as reflected in their sales revenue in the 
relevant domestic or foreign market. 
For investment in R&D and domestic marketing, there is also strong evidence for 
H8, namely that investment depends positively on the level of internal funds (β2 > 0), 
suggesting that in these areas firms face financial constraints (or at least a higher 
borrowing than lending rate of interest). The evidence on H8 is mixed with respect to 
investment in fixed capital and marketing on foreign markets, where all four estimated 
coefficients of β2 are positive but two are statistically insignificant. There is no support 
for H8 in either specification in the case of investment in employee training. The finding 
that investment in R&D is strongly related to internal funds makes sense since this is an 
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investment area with the greatest information asymmetry and moral hazard problem 
because it is difficult for external investors to evaluate the results of this type of 
investment (Arrow, 1962, and Himmelberg, Petersen, 1994). Overall, the Slovenian 
capital markets hence appear to have suffered from imperfections in the second half of 
the 1990s and firms may have suffered from credit rationing. This conclusion is also 
supported by the fact that most firms used external financing to a very limited extent, 
with internally generated funds (depreciation and retained profit) constituting the main 
source of investment funds.
29  
In the case of investment in R&D, we find strong support for hypothesis H9 (β3 < 
0) that employees are able to appropriate funds that would otherwise be used for this type 
of investment. The support for H9 is less strong in the case of investment in domestic and 
foreign marketing, with the estimate of β3 being negative in both specifications, but 
statistically significant in only one of them. There is no evidence that workers appropriate 
funds that would be used for investment in fixed capital (β3 = 0), and the coefficient is 
also insignificant in the IV specification in the case of investment in training. 
Interestingly, the effect is estimated to be positive and significant at the 10% test level for 
training in the random effects model. The positive effect may be brought about by the 
fact that firms sometime pursue policies that make the amount allocated to training funds 
proportional to the level of wages. In this case, the funds used to pay above market wages 
would be by design complemented by funds allocated to training, rather than being 
allocated to wages at the expense of investment in training. Overall, we hence find that 
above market wages and fringes are not paid at the expense of investment in fixed capital 
                                                           
29 The average firm in our sample financed more than 60 percent of its investment in fixed capital by 
depreciation, 10 percent by retained profit, 10 percent by long-term loans, 5 percent by short-term loans, 5 
percent by state funds and loans from other firms, 5 percent by disinvestments, and less than 1 percent by 
issues of shares. As to investment in R&D, the sampled firms on average financed 90 percent of this William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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or employee training, but a tradeoff is detected with respect to investment in R&D and 
less robustly with respect to investment in marketing on domestic and foreign markets. 
The estimated coefficient on external privatization (β 4) suggests that firms 
privatized primarily to external owners invest less in R&D (β 4 < 0) but more in 
marketing on domestic and foreign markets (β 4 > 0) than firms privatized 
primarily to insiders. Moreover, privatization to insiders vs. outsiders has no 
significant effect on investment in fixed capital and employee training (β 4 = 0). 
We hence find support for hypothesis H10a (β 4 > 0) with respect to investment in 
marketing, but H10b (β 4 = 0) with respect to investment in fixed capital and 
training. While only marginally significant, the IV result that firms privatized to 
external owners invest less in R&D (β4 < 0) is unexpected, given the substantial 
theorizing on this subject. One possible explanation for this negative coefficient 
and the insignificant coefficients in the case of investment in fixed assets is that 
the arguments about the myopic behavior of insiders are misplaced, especially 
once the shares are tradable and workers, like other investors, can behave as if they 
had an infinite investment horizon. Another possibility is that the negative effect 
reflects a more complicated relationship (than explored here) between EXTPRIV 
and the positive effects of external ownership that we report presently. Finally, as 
we mentioned in the methodology section, it is possible that in the IV specification 
the effect reflects nonrandom allocation of firms to the two forms of privatization. 
With respect to the last interpretation it should be noted, however, that we did not 
obtain qualitatively different results when we instrumented EXTPRIV. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
investment from internal funds, 3 percent by loans, less than 2 percent by funds firms received from the 
National Fund for Technology and Development, and 2 percent by funds from partners. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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Hypothesis H11a that firms owned more by outsiders (investment funds, 
other firms and miscellaneous other owners) invest more than firms owned more 
by insiders ( β 5 > 0 and/or β 6 > 0 and/or β 7 > 0) does not receive much support in 
the data. In particular, we find one positive effect (β 6 > 0) on ownership by other 
firms in the fixed effects specification of the investment in fixed assets and two 
positive effects with respect to investment in R&D (β 6 > 0 and β 7 > 0). All three 
effects are quantitatively rather small and the effect on fixed investment is only 
significant at the 10 percent test level. In contrast, the competing hypothesis H11b 
that firms owned more by outsiders invest the same as firms owned more by 
insiders (β 5 = β 6 = β 7 = 0) is fairly uniformly supported in the case of investment 
in fixed assets, employee training and marketing on foreign markets. It is also 
uniformly supported in the fixed effects specification in the case of investment in 
R&D and marketing on the domestic market. Interestingly, in the IV specification 
for investment in marketing on the domestic market, the effects of all three types 
of external ownership are negative, though quantitatively they are again not very 
large. These results complement the negative effect found earlier with respect to 
privatization to external owners.  
A higher percentage of external members on the supervisory board is found 
in most cases not to be associated with the firm’s propensity to invest, the 
exception being a small positive IV estimate with respect to investment in 
domestic marketing and a small negative IV estimate for investment in foreign 
marketing. Overall, the results therefore support hypothesis H12b (β 8 = 0). 
As in the case of labor adjustment, firm’s export vs. domestic market 
orientation is in virtually all cases unrelated to the intensity of investment 
activities. The one statistically significant coefficient is the negative effect of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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domestic market orientation on investment in R&D, but the effect is quantitatively 
negligible. Our estimates hence provide support for hypothesis H13b (β 9 = 0) that 
firms oriented more towards the domestic market invest the same as export-
oriented firms, ceteris paribus. 
 
5.   CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
While corporate restructuring plays an important part in all economies, it is of 
particular significance in the transition countries that started from a communist system 
characterized by firms dependent on government orders and subsidies, a lack of market-
based activities in the factor and product markets and limited use of modern managerial 
techniques within firms.
30 During the last decade, firms in the transition economies have 
responded to the major shock and challenge with substantial defensive (reactive) and 
strategic restructuring as they have tried to catch up with firms in the advanced countries. 
Our analysis covers the 1996-98 post-privatization period of transition and is 
based on rich data from a sample of 130 firms in Slovenia, one of the most developed 
transition countries. The analysis allows us to draw the following conclusions with 
respect to employment adjustment: 
1.  Firms actively adjust employment and the adjustment is of both defensive (short-
term) and strategic (long-term) nature. Our results support hypotheses H1 and 
H2b. 
2.  Despite the long standing debate in the literature about the employment effects of 
insider ownership and control of firms, we find strong evidence against the 
hypothesis that insider privatisation, employee ownership and employee control 
                                                           
30 In the early phases of restructuring, many of these firms broke up into several units or spun off parts of 
the original firm (Lizal, Singer and Svejnar, 2001). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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through supervisory board membership are associated with higher or lower 
employment intensity. Our analysis hence supports hypotheses H3b, H4b and 
H5b. 
3.  With the fall of the communist regime, many transition countries moved virtually 
overnight into the ranks of the most open economies in the world, thus defying the 
widely accepted infant industry thesis. Our results indicate that that firms selling a 
larger proportion of their output on the domestic market use the same amount of 
labor, ceteris paribus, as firms that sell more output on the foreign market. This 
evidence suggests that competition brought about by the openness of the transition 
economies to world markets ensures that exporting and non-exporting firms 
pursue the same employment restructuring policies, providing support to 
hypothesis H6a. 
Our conclusions with respect to strategic restructuring carried out through investment 
in fixed assets, R&D, marketing on domestic and foreign markets, and employee training 
are as follows: 
4.  Investment in employee training is small and virtually unrelated to any of the 
explanatory variables, suggesting that in the first decade of the transition firms 
have not been treating employee training as an investment. 
5.  We find considerable though not complete support for the hypothesis that the 
firms’ restructuring through investment is consistent with profit maximizing 
behavior. In the context of our model, this is reflected in investment being 
positively related to the demand for the firm’s product in the domestic or foreign 
market. The data hence provide reasonably strong support to hypothesis H7. 
6.  While firms rely primarily on internal financing to fund most of their investment, 
the evidence that restructuring through investment depends positively on the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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firm’s level of internal funds (hypothesis H8) is strong but not complete. 
Slovenian capital markets hence appear to have suffered from imperfections in the 
second half of the 1990s and firms may have suffered from credit rationing that 
made restructuring of the less successful firms more drawn out. 
7.  The ability of workers to appropriate firm’s internal funds as above-market wages 
does not appear to affect negatively restructuring through investment in fixed 
capital or training, but a trade-off between wages and investment (hypothesis H9) 
is detected with respect to investment in R&D and, less robustly, with respect to 
investment in marketing.  
8.  Evidence about the effect of privatization to external vs. internal owners is mixed, 
with the effect of external privatization on investment being insignificant in the 
case of fixed investment and investment in training (hypothesis H10b), while it is 
positive in the case of investment in marketing (hypothesis H10b). Interestingly, 
the effect is positive and marginally significant with respect to R&D, a finding 
that we discuss in the text. 
9.  We find quite strong support for the hypothesis (H11b) that firms owned more by 
outsiders than employee-insiders invest the same, controlling for other factors. 
Our findings, covering several areas of investment, suggest that the frequently 
voiced arguments about the inferiority of employee ownership for investment and 
long term prosperity of firms need to be re-examined. 
10. The proportion of external members vs. employee representatives on the 
supervisory boards is by and large found to be unrelated to the firm’s restructuring 
through investment. This result supports  hypothesis H12b and suggests that 
employee control through board representation may provide voice but does not 
affect restructuring decisions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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11. As in the case of labor adjustment, the firm’s export vs. domestic market 
orientation is found to be unrelated to investment activities. This evidence 
suggests that the relative openness of the transition economies to world markets 
has ensured that exporting and non-exporting firms pursue the same restructuring 
policies, providing support to hypothesis H13b. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
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TABLE  1:  SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN ESTIMATING 
LABOR ADJUSTMENT AND INVESTMENT EQUATIONS  
 
Variable N  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Description 
Lt  390  573.2  770.807  Number of employees 
* Wt = yt/Lt   380  2028.368 743.365  Labor costs per employee 
* Qt/Lt  379  10675.36 7157.959  Sales per employee  
* Kt  378 3110006  5629635  Value of tangible assets in 1996 prices 
It/K t-1  317  0.147  0.171  Investment in fixed capital/ capital-1 
IRD,t/K t-1  350  0.076  0.188  R&D Investment/ capital-1 
IM,t/K t-1  311  0.154  0.513  Total marketing expenses/ capital-1 
IMD,t/K t-1  305 0.125  0.511  Marketing  expenses on domestic market/ capital-1 
IMF,t/K t-1  305 0.030  0.069  Marketing  expenses on foreign markets/ capital-1 
IT,t/K t-1  270  0.007  0.024  Investment in training/ capital-1 
π
a
t/K t-1   275 
 
0.461 
 
0.653 
 
Value added less reservation labor costs plus R&D 
expenses, marketing expenses and training  
expenses/ capital-1 
(WL – W
aL) t/K t-1  367  0.052  0.830  Labor costs less reservation labor costs/ capital-1 
Qt/K t-1  367  2.842  2.661  Sales revenue/ capital-1 
OWNERINSIDERSt  368 37.618  19.503  Ownership share of managers, workers and former 
employees  
OWNERFUNDSt  368 37.018  17.773  Ownership share of state funds and investment 
companies  
OWNERFIRMSt  368  13.788  27.808  Ownership share of other firms 
OWNEROTHERt  368 11.556  16.663  Ownership share of banks, small shareholders, state, 
unrealised internal buy-outs and other 
EXTBOARDt  369 42.627  21.223  Share of non-employees’ representatives on the 
Supervisory Board 
HOMEMKTt  298  60.494  34.182  Sales on domestic  market relative to total sales 
EXTPRIV  640  0.468  0.499  Privatisation dummy (1=external; 0=internal) 
* Variables are measured in 1000 SIT in 1996 prices. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 541 
  35
TABLE 2:  LABOR ADJUSTMENT  
    (The dependent variable is ln(Lt), standard errors are reported in parentheses) 
 
 Variables  Coefficients OLS   Fixed Effects  IV 
lnQt 
α1  0.252
 a 
(0.050) 
0.181
 a 
(0.036) 
0.215
 a 
(0.043) 
lnQ t-1 
α2  -0.149
 a 
(0.054) 
-0.046 
(0.042) 
-0.091
 c 
(0.049) 
lnWt 
α3  -0.651
a 
(0.171) 
-0.617
 a 
(0.106) 
-0.318
 a 
(0.120) 
lnW t-1 
α4  0.495
 a 
(0.170) 
0.336
 a 
(0.094) 
0.108
  
(0.119) 
lnL t-1 
α5  0.900
 a 
(0.030) 
0.371
 a 
(0.074) 
0.887
 a 
(0.030) 
EXTPRIVt  α6  -0.005 
(0.010) 
N.A. 
 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
OWNERFUNDSt  α7  0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
OWNERFIRMSt  α8  0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000
 c 
(0.000) 
OWNEROTHERt  α9  -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
EXTBOARDt  α10  -0.000
 b 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000
 c 
(0.000) 
HOMEMKTt  α11  -0.000 
 (0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
YEAR 97  -0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
YEAR 98 
α12 
0.023
 c 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
Constant 
α0  0.333 
(0.318) 
3.995
 a 
(1.054) 
0.544
 b 
(0.230) 
Industry dummies  Yes No  Yes 
Short-run Elast.  
of L to W 
α3  -0.651
 a 
(0.078) 
-0.617
 a 
(0.106) 
-0.318
 a 
(0.120) 
Long-run Elast.  
of L to W  5
4 3
1 α
α α
−
+
  -1.560
 b 
(0.721) 
-0.446
 b 
(0.231) 
-1.867
 a 
(0.772) 
Short-run Elast. 
of L to Q 
α1  0.252
 a 
(0.029) 
0.181
 a 
(0.036) 
0.215
 a 
(0.043) 
Long-run Elast. 
of L to Q  5
2 1
1 α
α α
−
+
  1.032
 b 
(0.459) 
0.215
 a 
(0.091) 
1.097
 c 
(0.820) 
R
2  0.991 0.974  0.990 
N  268 268  200 
Notes: 
1. a, b and c denote statistically significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% on a two tail test, respectively. 
2. Hausman Tests χ
2-value FE vs RE:2762.51
 a. 
3. All estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity applying Huber-White-Sandwich estimator of 
variance. 
4. N.A. is the abbreviation for Not Applicable.  
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TABLE 3:  INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS, R&D, MARKETING, AND TRAINING 
(Standard errors are reported in parentheses.) 
 
It/Kt-1  IRD,t/Kt-1  IMD,t/Kt-1 I MF,t/Kt-1  It/Kt-1    
  
 Regressors 
  
 
Dep. 
Variables 
 
Random 
Effects  IV  Fixed 
Effects  IV  Fixed 
Effects  IV  Random 
Effects  IV  Random 
Effects  IV 
Qt/K t-1  β 1  0.018
 a 
(0.006) 
0.015 
(0.022) 
0.018
 a 
(0.002) 
0.067
 a 
(0.021) 
0.031
 a 
(0.003) 
0.043
 a 
(0.016) 
0.020
 a 
(0.002) 
0.017
 a 
(0.003) 
0.000
 c 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
π
a
t/K t-1  β 2  0.031 
(0.033) 
0.182
 b 
(0.081) 
0.097
 a 
(0.016) 
0.298
 b 
(0.124) 
0.245
 a 
(0.020) 
0.220
 a 
(0.073) 
0.028
 a 
(0.005) 
0.031 
(0.023) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
(WL – W
aL) t/K t-1  β 3  -0.066 
(0.084) 
-0.561 
(0.517) 
-0.159
 a 
(0.034) 
-1.286
 a 
(0.409) 
-0.201
 a 
(0.043) 
-0.237 
(0.405) 
-0.026
 b 
(0.011) 
-0.046 
(0.072) 
0.006
 c 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.025) 
EXTPRIV  β 4  0.003 
(0.027) 
-0.031 
(0.028)  N.A.  -0.069
 c 
(0.040) 
N.A.  0.089
 c 
(0.046) 
0.018
 b 
(0.007) 
0.021
 a 
(0.007) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
OWNERFUNDSt  β 5  -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.003
 a 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
OWNERFIRMSt  β 6  0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001
 c 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001
 b 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.002
 a 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
OWNEROTHERt  β 7  -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002
 b 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.002
 b 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
EXTBOARDt  β 8  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001
 a 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000
 c 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
HOMEMKTt  β 9  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000
 c 
(0.000) 
N.A. N.A. N.A.  N.A. -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Year dummies  β 10  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  β 0  0.061
 c 
(0.060) 
0.014 
(0.080) 
0.033
 b 
(0.040) 
-0.142
 b 
(0.102) 
-0.078
 c 
(0.041) 
0.018 
(0.054) 
-0.026
 b 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2  0.21 0.08  0.60 0.21 0.65 0.67 0.57  0.57  0.12  0.04 
Χ
2 value (FE vs. RE)  10.65  32.07
a  27.13
 a  7.23 6.65 
N  237 237  237 237 232 232 232  232  212  212 
Note: 
1. a, b and c denote statistically significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% on a two tail test, respectively. 
2. N.A. is the abbreviation for Not Applicable. 
3. In the IV models we use lagged levels of value added, labor costs and sales per capital, and regional dummies as instruments. 
4. All estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity applying Huber-White-Sandwich variance estimator. 
5. In the case of investment in marketing on domestic and foreign markets we use Qt to reflect sales revenues on domestic and foreign markets 
respectively.  
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